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Abstract 
This project sets out to analyze the coercive nature of the European Union in regards to the illegal 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula, by the Russian Federation. In doing so, it seeks to evaluate, 
through the specific framework of Alexander George, Tom Sauer and Mikael Eriksson, the 
typology of the sanctions, the economic effect of the sanctions and whether or not sanctions as a 
diplomatic tool, for the EU, have been in line with the theory of Intergovernmentalism. This 
constitutes the overarching framing of EU, the inherent international relations and analytical 
apparatus of the project. The analysis is conducted via a document analysis of the sanctions 
themselves, which in the first phase indexes them in typologies of the framework of George. 
Thereafter the typology will be set against the economic evolution of the Russian economy, within 
the timeframe of the project. Finally the assumptions of Intergovernmentalism will be applied to the 
sanction regime - and thus the conduct of EU - itself to conclude whether or not, the coercive 
measures taken have been in line with contemporary theoretical distinctions. The project concludes, 
that EU has followed a rational action plan, and therefore must be said to be in line with the 
theoretical framework. 
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1.0 Introduction 
"Speak softly, and carry a big stick." (Art & Cronin, 2007; 300). 
 
As the Cold War drew to a close, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, the 
international order changed (ibid; 301). The enmity between the Warsaw Pact and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was gone, new alliances were built, but as it came to be, war 
still loomed eminent. The end of the Cold War however sparkled hope for a long peace within the 
European continent and the new Russian Federation (Fukuyama 1989). 
 
This peace was not to last however. During the 1990s the European Union (EU) was preview to 
another devastating conflict; namely that of the Yugoslavian Wars, which, as a result of the 
Yugoslav Federation's dissolution unleashed contending demands of national self-determination. 
This ensued in the genocide of the Markala market in 1994 (Art & Cronin, 2007; 304). The futile 
efforts of diplomacy by the EU ensured the United States (US) led NATO operation of coercion of 
Serbs and Muslims, thus ending the Bosnian War (ibid; 304). 
 
The 1st of March 2014, the Federation of Russia sanctioned the use of armed forces within the 
territory of Ukraine (EEAS 2014; 3). This was to be the first movements in the event that threw the 
EU into a political and strategic strain, which, inexorably led to the diplomatic measures taken 
against the Russian Federation, that followed, and which was initiated the 17th of March 2014 
(Factsheet 2014; 1) (Background Note 2014). These initial actions came as an action to compel 
Russia to amend their belligerent actions towards Ukraine (Factsheet 2014; 1) (Background Note 
2014). Before such actions could be taken, however, the strategic narrative of the EU had to be 
facilitated, in such a way, as to adhere to international law - the very law, that the Russian 
Federations itself seemed to breach (Alter 2014). Thus, with the invasion of Ukrainian territory the 
stage was set for political and diplomatic affairs that had not been seen since the early 1990s. 
 
With the invasion of Ukrainian territory, the Russian Federation broke its sovereign integrity and 
thus international law (UN Charter 2014). The question remains, what are the adequate measures 
and how are they faring in the coercive environment between the EU and the Russian Federation in 
the short term. What seems to be clear though is that the post Cold War era has ended, and that the 
EU in the foreseeable future should acknowledge the Russian intimidation (Rasmussen et al 2014; 
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21-22). Although not on the brink of another Cold War the EU and Russia seem to be teetering on a 
divergence in which aggravations are solved, not by peaceful resolutions, but with physical force. 
This has increased the need for a heightened readiness among the members of EU and NATO alike. 
Russia has shown a determination in deployment of military force and must be calculated in relation 
to this (Oliker et. al 2009; 5-6) (Quinlivan & Oliker 2011; 14-17) (Rasmussen et al 2014; 32). 
 
 
1.1 Problem Field 
This project sets out to analyze the implications of the EU sanctions against Russia and evaluate the 
types of strategic measures taken against Russia - in response to the illegal annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula, by the Federation of Russia and subsequent illegal referendum of it - 
specifically the sanctions deployed by the EU. The research will be based upon empirical datasets, 
theoretical conceptualization and will approach a conclusion pertaining to the typology of the 
sanctions and how they may or may not have the desired effect, which is to compel the target 
(JSWD 2014; 2). 
 
This conclusion will be inserted into a broader perspective, where, through the analytical 
framework of Intergovernmentalism, the possibility of an increase or a decrease in the compelling 
force of the coercive diplomacy will be parallelized. This will occur in conjunction with the 
typology of the sanctions, thus assessing whether or not the employed sanctions from a theoretical 
point of view must be deducted as effective in compelling Russia. 
  
To conduct this research, the project group thus needs to have a succinct understanding of the 
theory of Intergovernmentalism, which will be applied as the theoretical framework in which the 
battle space of EU foreign policy will be observed through.  
 
The project will be completed in three steps. First a clarification of the coercive environment of the 
EU, specifically what tools have been utilized, in the effort to compel the Russian Federation. 
Second, the evolution of the coercive events taken, in terms of the extensiveness and severity will 
be subjected to analysis through the use of quantitative datasets. This will allocate the quantitative 
capabilities of the employed tools, which will permit the project to draw a parallel by means of the 
qualitative typology of the measures themselves.  
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This will demonstrate the breadth and depth of the coercive diplomatic resources, to such an extent 
that a correlation between them can be made. This binary reciprocity will be gauged in relation to 
the analytical framework of Intergovernmentalism which will show, how and to what extent the 
diplomatic tools of the EU are appropriate. It will further adhere to the thoughts of international 
relations being an anarchical system, from whence the theoretical framework stems. This has led to 
the research question, which follows: 
 
"To what extent are the sanctions of the European Union against the Russian Federation in 
accordance with contemporary theoretical convictions, the appropriate coercive measures taken?" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
2.0 Methods 
This chapter sets off with a short presentation of the theoretical framework for this project, namely 
Intergovernmentalism, as well as how this theory will be supported by theoretical distinctions 
regarding the use of coercive diplomacy as mentioned in the research question when referring 
contemporary theoretical convictions. 
 
This approach is chosen since it not only allows for the clarification of the implementation of the 
supplementary theoretical distinctions within the context of the overall theoretical framework of the 
project, but it enables a precise delimitation of corresponding analysis while at the same time 
highlights the impediments of the theoretical framework. This is essential when establishing the 
operationalization. This allows the project group to soundly build its methods around the theory, 
ensuring correlation. 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical presentation 
The theoretical framework is constituted by Intergovernmentalism. This broad applicable 
distinction will be supplemented by specifically the coercive diplomacy theories, which in more 
detail pertain to the actual dilemma at hand. The theory of Intergovernmentalism will mainly be 
defined by Stanley Hoffman in his book "The European Sisyphus: Essays On Europe, 1964-1994" 
(1995) Michelle Cini in the anthology "European Union Politics" (2013), Sabine Saurugger 
"Theoretical Approaches to European Integration" (2014). These pieces form the main syllabus on 
Intergovernmentalism, albeit it will be supported by further theoretical reflections, which more 
precisely frame the research question. These theoretical supplements include the work of Alexander 
George in "Forceful Persuasion" (1991), Tom Sauer in "Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Case 
of Iran" (2007) and Alexander George, David Hall and William Simons in "The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam" (1971) and finally Mikael Eriksson in "Targeting Peace" (2011). 
These supply the direct theoretical implications to the research question, while 
Intergovernmentalism supplies the lens through which the theories are viewed.  
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2.1.1 The choice of Intergovernmentalism 
The theory permits not only a view on the EU, but the international community, via a realist lens 
that interprets the EU, with the understanding of international relations as anarchical and where 
states are assumed to have no friends, but merely interests. As this project pertains to the coercive 
diplomatic measures taken, against Russia. Intergovernmentalism therefore delivers a set of gauges 
in accordance with the understanding of international relations. 
 
This distinction is chosen, since it not only facilitates the research question, but simultaneously 
enables the measure of international reflection needed, to place into perspective the theoretical 
arguments and deeper implications of international relations concordantly. 
 
 
2.2 Research methods 
Here follows the accounts of the research method. 
 
 
2.2.1 Mixed Method 
In this project a mixed method approach will be applied. The quantitative approach provides a 
measurable indication of the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy. When it comes to the 
explanatory arguments of the quantitative data, it does not encompass in-depth contextualization, 
which means it only outline the overall effect.  
 
Including only quantitative data, without proper contextualization, would not provide a sufficient 
analysis of why the sanctions are constructed as they are (Bryman 2012; 628-48). The qualitative 
element is constituted by document analysis of EU sanctions. By using our selected theories, it is 
possible to deconstruct the EU documents so as to extract important information of the coercive 
methods. The combination of quantitative and qualitative data therefore complement each other, 
and therefore enhance the analysis. The project group does acknowledge that mixed methods has 
critics within the academic community. (1) The combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods is impossible, because it entail different epistemologies, and (2) each have their own 
methodological paradigms (ibid; 629-30).  
12 
 
2.2.2 Sanction episode 
As reviewed in our literature review, we deemed Eriksson's (2011) methodology of evaluating 
sanctions, as an episode, a method of evaluating EU's sanction regime. Arguably, evaluating an 
ongoing international crisis is difficult without resorting to educated speculations. In short, by using 
sanction episode, we determine whether or not the sanctions had the desired effect on the target 
within the defined period.  
A defined period allows us to limit the scope of data. In confining ourselves to a specific time frame 
we ensure that the ongoing events will not skew the analysis. As shown in the literature review, it is 
difficult to examine whether sanctions had the desired effect on the target. Hence, incorporating this 
specific method of examining the efficacy of sanctions. This approach takes into account the 
sender-receiver relationship and the events that came afterwards (see literature review). For 
instance, there could have been an escalation of the conflict which caused the sanctions to be 
imposed in the first place, thus this way of examining sanctions allows the researchers to account 
for said change. 
The next section on empirical data will further explain the limitation of the timeframe with our 
chosen sanction’s episodes.  
 
 
2.3 Empirical data 
The sanction episode is therefore defined as being from March 17th until September 19th. This 
period is framed by the first enacted sanction up until the last implemented before the Minsk 
Protocol. The protocol was signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the separatists mediated by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on September 5th, but followed up 
with a memorandum on September 19th due to violations of the cease fire. This can be constituted 
as an attempt to create a peace process. In this time frame, from the 17th of March to the 12th of 
September the EU agreed to enact sanctions, articulated as "restrictive measures", shown in the 
table on the next page. The table is made by the project group, based upon EU sanction documents 
which is added in the bibliography. 
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A mixture of primary and secondary sources will be used. Our primary sources are the EU 
documents as highlighted on the previous page. The use of secondary sources stems from academic 
documents that contextualize the situation, by outlining important variables that shape the bedrock 
of the sanctions. However, since this is a recent and still ongoing event, the amount of academic 
literature on the current international crisis is scarce. Due to this delay, BBC, Jyllands-Posten, 
ITAR-TASS, Moscow Times, and Reuters will provide an information foundation. 
A part of our quantitative data will be collected by the previously mentioned EU documents that 
will outline the number of individuals and entities via a visual representation. Additionally, the 
quantitative data will be comprised of economic indicators from the World Bank, Finnish Ministry 
of Finance, European Leadership Network, and previous news outlets.  
 
 
2.4 Validity 
"Valid measurement is achieved when scores (including the results of qualitative classification) 
meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept."(Adcock & Collier 2001; 
530) 
 
Concerning validity measurement, it is important to specify the connection between the concept, 
from which we base our measurement, and how scores correspond. Scores are never examined 
isolated, as they are interpreted and given meaning by the systematized concept (ibid; 531). The 
systematized concept is utilized, i.e. by applying George's five indicators from which scores can be 
produced (See 3.2.1). Validation is therefore based on the defined indicators. These five indicators 
would then be classified into three typologies of strategies i.e. "ultimatum", "try and see" and 
"turning the screw". 
 
 
2.5 Delimitation  
This project is delimited from including or conducting interviews to gain insight of the EU's 
sanctions against Russia.  
The project group acknowledges that many approaches or theories of explaining EU sanctions 
regime against Russia exists, but this project focuses on Intergovernmentalism and selected 
Coercive Diplomacy branches.  
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When examining EU's sanction regime against Russia, other actors are involved, especially the US. 
However, within this project foreign actors have been excluded due to the focus on the EU 
specifically, and the inevitable disjunction of such would entail, albeit acknowledges the 
implications such actors might induce.  
 
The project recognizes that certain internal dynamics of the EU decision making process creates the 
diplomatic environment, but since the focus is on member states on a more general level and on the 
inherent economics, these have not been included. While few cases of state interests will be 
included, these cases will be selected accordingly to the relevancy of the theoretical frameworks.  
 
 
2.6 Philosophy of Science  
Critical realism, by Roy Bhaskar, is an appropriate position of philosophy of science, for the 
project’s epistemological world view and correlation to the overall abductive nature of the analysis. 
There are three main characteristics of critical realism. First, causal explanations are a possibility, 
which is why it is fitting to use it in the evaluations of measures of coercive diplomacy imposed by 
the EU. Secondly, it accepts that reality is socially constructed without making constructivist 
conclusions. Thirdly, most variations of realism also assumes a critical dimension (Delanty 2005).  
There are three levels of reality in critical realism which constitute the realist ontology. These are 
visible in the figure below. The real mechanisms are made up of causal structures and powers. It 
can be a naturally created, as well as a socially 
created level, however it exists regardless of 
whether the actors have knowledge of it. This 
encompasses the other levels as well. The actual 
level is constructed by the activation of the real 
level. The difference between the two is that the 
real level is the objectively constructed world, 
while the actual is the reality which is generated 
by the activation of the real level. The empirical 
level is the ones humans subjectively experience, 
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and is influenced by the other levels (ibid.). 
 
In this project, the levels correspond to the measures of coercive diplomacy, the causes of the 
measures being taken and the solution to the causes. Another relevant argument for the case of 
critical realism is the concept of mechanisms which is one of Bhaskar’s main ideas (ibid.). He 
argues that social reality is constructed of ‘generative mechanisms’ which generate events. Society 
is causally structured which leads to the generative mechanisms being completely cut off from the 
events they cause. It is especially useful as it allows the researcher to describe the events and does 
not strive for an ultimate truth. 
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3.0 Theory 
 
Here follows the account of Intergovernmentalism, the overarching theoretical framework of the 
project. Following this, the supplementary theories will be presented. 
 
 
3.1 Intergovernmentalism 
Intergovernmentalism is widely known as a state centric European integration theory which bases 
its assumptions on classical theories of international relations; namely that of the realist school (Cini 
2013; 72). States are sovereign and they interact in an anarchical environment where no global 
authority exists (ibid.). States therefore define their interests based on their position in this system. 
Within the realist paradigm, security is the main objective of states, combined with the 
accumulation of power. This is true also within Intergovernmentalism (ibid.). From this realist 
distinction, Intergovernmentalism too is apprehensive of the notion of the creation of a higher 
community than the state. This does not remove the use for international organizations, but 
acknowledges that these are there to serve as the stage of conduction of international relations and 
so can and will be discarded, provided they are no longer desirable or some way restrict the actions 
of member states - within the boundaries of international law (ibid; 73). It is these assumptions with 
which Intergovernmentalism perceives the EU (Hoffman 1995; 71-72) (Saurugger 2014; 58-59). 
The table below sums up the main assumptions of Intergovernmentalism; 
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3.1.1 Cooperation and Interests 
Hoffman affirms in "Reflections on the Nation-State" (1995; 211-226) that cooperation within the 
EU is limited in scope by economic considerations, albeit politics will have preponderance to 
economy, thus the EU is an economic integration entity and not a political one. This reflects the two 
concepts that Hoffman presents, which embodies high politics (security) and low politics (economy) 
(Hoffman 1995; 83-85) (Saurugger 2014; 58-59). 
 
Within Intergovernmentalism, integration rests on the concept of cooperation, which is in turn 
founded on the idea that it is: "[...] conservative and pragmatic." (Cini 2013; 73). And "[s]ince the 
situation of each state is unique in the world, cooperation between states cannot lead to an 
homogenous system, but rather to diversity, highlighted by intergovernmental bargaining in which 
individual leaders exert influence to various degrees." (Saurugger 2014; 58).  
 
In this context, the rational notion of the state thus makes international cooperation not based on 
ideology but on rational cost-benefit analyses. Cooperation is a zero sum game, where weighing the 
pros and cons will ensure the most fruitful end is reached. Eventually this means that the integrative 
aspect of Intergovernmentalism can be used to perceive not only integration within the EU, but 
cooperation in general (ibid; 56-57). The theory acknowledges that this cooperation can be 
beneficial for a number of reasons, survival being the obvious. This is due to the asymmetrical 
relationship which subsides in any international system. Therefore the cooperation of states is seen 
as rational or even mundane (Moravcsik & Schimmelfenning 2009; 72, 82). However, as long as 
states find cooperation meaningful, the EU as an actor has the ability to operate on the international 
scene by pooling sovereignty (Saurugger 2014; 55).  
 
In all, cooperation within the context of Intergovernmentalism is seen as a normal occurrence 
between states. Cooperation is based on rational choice and is believed to be beneficial for 
numerous reasons, albeit limited by the member states' interests. Important is that these pools of 
sovereignty are considered agents of the sovereign state, and not supranational (Cini 2013; 74).  
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3.2 Supplementary theories 
This section serves as an extension of the literature review i.e. it will tie the supplementary theories 
to the case of Russia while explaining the basic assumptions of the theories. 
 
3.2.1 Alexander George and Tom Sauer 
It has become apparent that Sauer’s work (2007) on coercive diplomacy was based on the 
foundations laid down by George (1971, 1991), hence they are in one section. According to George 
there are 5 variables that need to be accounted for in coercive diplomacy. These are 1) clear 
communication 2) sense of urgency 3) credible threat 4) decision to include a positive element 5) 
motivation (See literature review for an extended explanation). Based on these variables George 
presented his three typologies on coercion. These were “Ultimatum”, “Try and See” and “Turning 
the Screw” (See literature review for an extended explanation). 
 
Sauer continues George’s assumptions, as he delves into what makes coercive diplomacy 
successful. He also discusses what other forms of coercive diplomacy are applicable outside 
economic sanctions. The rate of success is based on five questions 1) legitimacy of threat 2) more 
demands in the future 3) credibility of threat 4) credibility of time pressure 5) motivation. These are 
all explained in great detail in the literature review. 
 
 
3.2.2 Mikael Eriksson 
He presents an approach which has become the norm of implementing sanctions. He proposes that 
comprehensive sanctions are outdated, hence the move towards targeted sanctions; specifically 
targeting individuals. In the literature review, targeted sanctions do not focus as much on realist 
assumptions as the comprehensive ones do, i.e. sanctions are targeting the responsible individuals 
with asset freezes, visa bans among other impediments. In the case of Russia, the sanctioned 
individuals are the political and economic elite close to President Putin
1
. As it has been presented in 
2.3, this project will use sanctions episodes. This is an essential component of Eriksson’s book, 
"Targeting Peace" (2011). Sanctions episodes allow for a thorough examination of a set timeline of 
sanctions. It aids the project in limiting the timeframe of the research, thereby excluding some 
elements (see 2.3 and literature review).  
                                               
1 See EU documents (L78 - L271) 
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3.2.3 Summary 
To summarize, George is the 
foundation of the first phase of 
the analysis as his indicators 
provide a definition of the EU's 
restrictive measures. On top of 
George's foundation Sauer 
supplements by providing an 
understanding of efficiency in 
the second phase. In the end, 
Eriksson will supplement both 
George and Sauer in both parts of the analysis. As illustrated, Eriksson’s targeted sanctions are 
merely a tool of coercive diplomacy. However, sanctions are the most utilized form of coercive 
diplomacy (Eriksson 2011).  
 
 
3.3 Application of the theoretical frameworks 
In the following section the application of the theoretical framework of Intergovernmentalism and 
the supplementary coercive diplomacy theories will be presented. The latter will be presented 
initially as it will be applied first in the analysis. 
 
 
3.3.1 Supplement theory 
When applying the assumption of George and Sauer's work, the simple application calls for the 
succinct approach of the theory itself. The theoretical significance is “Ultimatum”, “Try and See” 
and “Turning the Screw”. These indicators will be applied to perceive the first phase of the analysis, 
which deals with the typologies of the sanctions of the EU, in such a way, as to code the sanctions. 
This will aid and enable the second and third phase of the analysis. Each analyzed sanction will be 
evaluated against the tripartition of the typology. That will enable the project group to categorize 
the sanctions and thus show the development over time and severity. 
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Specifically the second phase implies the evolution of the sanctions against Russia. These will be 
displayed through the works of Sauer, who shows the efficacy of sanctions. This has the effect of 
showing the severity of the sanctions in such a way as to show the evolution of the force applied by 
the EU. This further allows the project group to draw a parallel between time and action. 
 
 
3.3.2 Intergovernmentalism 
By viewing the EU, and the broader international system through the lens of Intergovernmentalism, 
and in relation to 4.1 and 4.2, the EU's behavior will be analyzed through the theoretical 
assumptions of Intergovernmentalism. To begin with the analysis will, through the concepts of high 
and low politics, explain what prompted the EU to sanction Russia. Secondly, the theory answers 
why the EU enacted the sanctions, and finally, why didn't the EU enact harsher sanctions against 
Russia. The findings, of this part of the analysis, will be based upon the said core concepts. 
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4.0 Analysis 
 
This chapter initiates with the first phase of the analysis by examining the typology of the sanction 
application of the EU. 
 
 
4.1 Typology of sanctions 
By applying Georges' five indicators on Eriksson sanction episode, defined as 17th of March until 
19th of September, we have analyzed the 12 EU sanctions documents.  
 
 
4.1.1 Initial sanctions 
The sanctioning was initiated on 17th of March 2014 by the Council of the European Union, where 
the EU established two primary goals. EU: 
1. "[...] called on the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its armed 
forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the 
relevant agreements." 
2. "[...]called on the Russian Federation to enable immediate access for 
international monitors". - (L78 2014; 6). 
 
The two goals indicate that the EU has clear goals and has communicated to the target its intent, 
thereby meeting the first criteria. Within the document, the measurement utilized was "[...] travel 
bans, asset freezes and the cancellation of the EU-Russia summit." (ibid; 6). The solution to crisis, 
recommended by the EU, is negotiations between Ukraine and Russia (ibid.).  
Although the EU stresses urgency, the deadline is set for 17th of September (ibid; 18). This shows 
ambiguity at that time in relation to the longevity of compliance. However, absence of results 
within the timeframe would invoke additional measures (ibid; 16). This is classified as an indicator 
of George's fourth point.  
 
In addition, George's third point is that sufficient credible threat of punishment must be present. 
While the EU did enact measures, Article 4 and 7, do give Member States the possibility to uplift 
the sanction, if "[...] justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need." (ibid.). While it lowers 
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credible threat, it shows an element of Eriksson's point; that humanitarian concerns are included 
(Eriksson 2011; 12, 22). Whether this has been used is unknown. In terms of the typology, L78 is 
characterized as 'try-and-see' approach.  
 
The EU amended L78, on 21
st 
of March, 28
th
 of April, 12
th
 of May, and 24
th
 of May, the criteria for 
listing, which resulted in additional individual and entities - but these amendments didn't add new 
instruments (L86 2014) (L126 2014) (L137 2014) (L160 2014). By way of the observation, or lack 
of indicators, we see these amendments as a continuation of L78 and therefore a simple 'turning of 
the screw', in specific measures of adding more individuals and entities to the list. However, the 
second goal that the EU had, was fulfilled on the 21
st
 of March as OSCE observers were sent to 
Ukraine (OSCE 2014). However, the situation didn't change.  
 
The following sanction has arguably been implemented to correspond with the recently signed 
Association Agreement, signed on March 21
st
, which established a political and economic 
association between the EU and Ukraine (Council Conclusion 2014a; 12). Therefore, on the 24
th
 of 
June the EU broadened the spectrum of sanction instruments. The EU implemented the following: 
"It shall be prohibited: (a) to import into the European Union goods originating in 
Crimea or Sevastopol; (b) to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial 
assistance as well as insurance and reinsurance related to the import of the goods 
referred to in point (a)." (L183 2014; 10). 
This constituted an increase of severity, by enacting a trade and financial embargo against Crimea 
and Sevastopol. This was done to signal to Russia as well as separatists in Crimea and Sevastopol 
that the EU condemns the annexation of Crimea and Russia's involvement. The EU is willing to 
forge closer relations with Ukraine while excluding Crimea. While not an amendment of L78 - 
albeit a step in escalation by inflicting further punishment - this is a continuation of the initial 
sanction and thus deemed, a 'tightening of the screw'. On the 12th of July EU enacted L205 which 
amended the list and added additional individuals analyzed as a slight ‘tightening of the screw’.  
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4.1.2 Escalation 
Shortly after on July 17th 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight 17 (MH17) was brought down in eastern 
Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists, which encouraged comprehensive sanctions (BBC 2014). To 
show an immediate reaction, on 19th of July, the EU enacted L214 which only added individuals to 
the list. This is analyzed as a slight 'tightening of the screw.’ To further pressure on Russia, the 
Council of the European Union adopted on July 22nd the conclusion that the EU is prepared to 
"[...]introduce without delay a package of further significant restrictive measures [...]" if they do not 
comply and began drafting new restrictive measures (Council Conclusion 2014b; 2). Hence on July 
25th an amendment was adopted where more people were added to the list of sanctioned individuals 
in connection to the conflict.  
 
Following the conclusion on July 22
nd
 the EU drafts for further restrictive measures had been 
completed which introduced new restrictive measures adopted on July 30
th
. It was a different form 
of sanction as it did not concern Russia specifically. It was “concerning restrictions on the import 
into the Union of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol” (L226 2014; 4). This was meant to 
weaken the economy of Eastern Ukraine by prohibiting any financial aid. The reviewing of the 
restrictions, more specifically Article 4e of the regulation, was put at December 31
st
, 2014 thereby 
setting a clear deadline in terms of non-compliance (ibid.). The EU, it seemed, was still utilizing a 
“turning the screw” approach as there had been no considerable change in sanctions or other tools 
of coercive diplomacy e.g. threatening had only been utilized to a minimal extent even though there 
had been an escalation of the crisis. 
 
The next day
 
i.e. on the 31
st
 of July another set of amendments emerged from the Council. It 
prohibited the export of dual-use goods to Russia “related to the supply of arms and military 
equipment” (L229 2014; 1). Opposed to previous sanctions this did not provide a so-called loophole 
in terms of what the competent authorities of the Member States were permitted to do. It states that 
the authorities: 
“… shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or 
body in Russia …., if they have reasonable grounds to believe that …. that the goods might 
have a military end-use.“ (ibid; 3) 
Unlike the previous sanctions this seems to meet more of George’s indicators. Article 9 explained 
that “The restrictive measures laid down in this Decision shall be reviewed no later than 31 
October 2014 [...]” (ibid; 16) while also explaining that this document was under constant review 
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and that it shall be amended if it is appropriate thereby meeting the criteria of time pressure. 
Furthermore, “These measures will be kept under review and may be suspended or withdrawn, or 
be supplemented by other restrictive measures, in light of developments on the ground.” (ibid; 1). 
Thereby illustrating that further restrictive measures will be implemented if Russia does not 
cooperate. This amendment also concerned export of technologies pertaining “to deep water oil 
exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia.” 
(ibid; 3). It also prohibited the purchase and sale of bonds to/from “major credit institutions or 
finance development institutions established in Russia with over 50 % public ownership.” (ibid; 
14). The EU was utilizing a more forceful turning of the screw in terms of typologies. Sanctioning 
different sectors of the Russian economy as well as preventing any advancements in military 
technologies was the choice of turning the screw instead of adding more people to the list.  
 
Even though the last sanction was more comprehensive, the trend did not continue as the 
amendment on September 12
th
 - the last one before the Minsk protocol - did not include any new 
restrictive measures. Instead, it reinforced the measures already in place as well as extend the list of 
sanctioned individuals and entities. Revisions have been made to the documents for clarification. 
The turning the screw approach was still the path of the EU (L271 2014; 1-14, 47-58). 
 
To summarize, the EU has followed some of the points George argued were needed in order to 
coerce a target. This follows the Turning of the Screw approach, thereby indicating that the EU 
have utilized small but incremental tools over time. A key observation made is that only a few times 
were these indicators present. Why the sanctions were structured as they are, will be touched upon 
in 4.3. What effect these sanctions might have is subject in the next section.  
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4.2 Impact of the sanctions 
In 4.1, the EU sanctions were analyzed. In this section the efficiency will be analyzed. 
The Sender-receiver relation throughout the defined period indicate, that the approach of the EU, 
didn't seem like a credible threat to begin with. The threat was considered not credible, and Russia,  
 
according to Flemming Splidsboel, took them lightly (JP 2014). Russia continued their actions, and 
later enacted countersanctions against the EU and the US (ITAR-TASS 2014). This showed that 
Russia was motivated despite the efforts made by the EU and the US. However, MH17 was a game 
changer and following that date the scope of the sanctions changed.  
 
There seems to be a clear indication, in the graph on the previous page, that after the MH17 
incident, the EU took broader sanctions in use. This was evident as an increase of total targets after 
the event. Throughout the sanction episodes, Russia's economic situation changed as well.  
To begin with, on the 9
th
 of July Reuters reported that:"Russia's economy is stagnating as [...] $75 
billion has left the country so far this year following sanctions on Moscow over its involvement in 
Ukraine" (Reuters 2014). This was before the shooting down of MH 17 and shows that the 
sanctions and market distrust caused a capital flight (ibid.). 
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For instance, after the incident, the 
Finnish Ministry of Finance 
estimated that the effects would, in 
most areas, be limited, but the effects 
of the capital flight was the most 
serious threat to the Russian 
economy - and it still is (MOF 2014). 
Without capital investment from the 
West, the Russian economy would be 
weakened as the West provided huge 
investments globally (ibid.). This 
correlates with Ben Aris: "Capital investment needs to be at least 25% of GDP if the economy is to 
grow, but in the last few quarters investment has actually been shrinking and is currently about 
20% " (Aris 2014; 2). 
The result of the capital flight 
was that Russia's GDP began 
shrinking for each quarterly 
frequency - shown above - and 
estimated by the World Bank 
(2014) that the economy is 
stagnating or in recession.  
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The impact of the sanctions is visible by looking at the graph on previous page, which outlines the 
Ruble against the Dollar and Euro. The World Bank indicated, that since the start of the year the 
Ruble has lost 45 % of its value against the Dollar (ibid.). However, this had a positive element. 
Russian manufactures increased demand by importing more, while the negative effect was that 
Russian food prices increased because they couldn't supply the demand (ibid.). This was due to the 
food import ban that Russia enacted in August 2014 (ibid.).  
 
At another point, the sanctions against technology to extract the fossil energy, as highlighted in 4.1, 
were having an impact. By excluding Russian energy companies the necessary technology, Russia's 
ability to produce oil and gas 
will be more difficult, thus their 
revenue shrinks (Amos 2014). 
This effect is visible in the 
graph above, which shows that 
shortly before July 17
th
, and 
afterwards, oil prices dropped. 
In detail, the amount that oil 
and gas provides the Russian 
economy was estimated to be 
68 % of all export, which was 
$246 billion in 2013 (EIA 2014). This is visible in the graphs on the previous page, which shows 
the allocation of Russia's revenue. By comparing both the sanction on oil and gas extraction 
technology and the oil prices dropping, Russia's financial strength is weakened. It is estimated that 
they will lose $2 billion dollars for each dollar that oil prices drops (Amos 2014). However, the oil 
prices are also influenced by the Middle East's struggle to retain market shares, which is an external 
variable in relation to the sanctions (ibid.).  
 
To sum up, in the beginning there were less clear threats for the EU to impose. However, efficiency 
and scope of the sanctions is observable especially later, as the impact is taking a toll on Russia. It 
seems therefore that the infliction could explain why Russia signed the Minsk Protocol in late 
September. However, as of now the situation has not changed radically (OSCE 2014). 
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4.3 Rationalization of the Sanctions 
When applying Intergovernmentalism to the sanctions actions of the EU, it's important to look at 
the way that the theory explains behavior. The theory thus has two converging assumptions which 
in conjunction to each other, found the premise for behavior within the context of the theory. One 
being that of security the other being cooperation. Within this context two different notions reside; 
namely high and low politics (Hoffmann 1995; 211-226) (Cini 2013; 71-84) (Saurugger 2014; 59). 
 
When taking into account the actions of the EU on the 17
th
 of March 2014, at which time the initial 
sanctioning of Russia was enacted, one might call this a defining moment of high politics. And why 
is that? Within the theory itself is an underlying assumption of the zero-sum game which by virtue 
of itself means to reinforce the state by the simplicity from the politics of "do ut des". This we see 
in numerous places within the sanctions itself: "[...] the unprovoked violation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation [...] in accordance with the relevant 
agreements." (L78 2014; 6). This shows, not only the focus on the state, but simultaneously the 
strict reciprocity of the sanctions - thus the strict reciprocity of the EU. This is not something 
spectacular within the dogma of Intergovernmentalism, but a mundane part of the overarching 
theoretical assumption, which by its very nature enforces the nation-state itself (Cini 2013; 71-84). 
So for what reason was the sanction enacted? This reciprocity is directly linked to the idea of 
cooperation, which is linked directly to the salient interests of the particular states. What this means, 
when observed with the lens of Intergovernmentalism, is that the asymmetrical relationship which 
permeates any international system, the EU in particular, determines the behavior of the states 
(Hoffmann 1995; 211-226). Unilateral action towards Russia, would be, albeit legal and in the spirit 
of Intergovernmentalism, fought with hardship, as legitimacy would be weaker and the 
asymmetrical power balances greater for all but the most powerful states. Thus, a collective EU is a 
strong EU. The sanctions however were enacted, because of the collective safety, and the broad 
legitimate foundation of the EU. The amalgamation of states in sanctioning Russia would therefore 
send a more powerful signal and seeing as a single state could not hope to cordon, compel or deter 
Russia, a collective grouping can. This is well within the theory and in the interest of numerous 
states. Not only does it send a clear message of where your alliances lie, but clearly defines the 
strategic borders as well (Hoffmann 1995; 211-226). 
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Sanctions therefore, in the light of Intergovernmentalism, are a symbol of cooperation of high 
politics, a symbol of states' interests and the EU becomes the forum of conduct of international 
relations by the pooling of sovereignty - due in no small part to the inherent asymmetry, of not only 
the internal, but most importantly the external as well (Cini 2013; 74). The sanction of the 17
th
 of 
March 2014 shows, by the emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity, that states continue to 
be the preponderant form of society, and while economic interdependence has become increasingly 
important, the notion of war of conquest, immediately activates the security apparatus. Russia's 
subjugation of Ukraine demand, reaction and since interstate war seldom can be said to be in 
anyone's interest, coercive diplomacy fits the bill in absence of "jus ad bellum". 
 
The question then remains though, why has the EU not done more, or more correctly have they 
done more? In terms of the comprehensive sanctions against Russia enacted and amended after the 
initiation of the founding sanction of the 17th of March, it shows an increase and a convergence to 
strengthen the collaboration even further cementing the legitimacy of the sanctions and the forum of 
international relations; namely the EU. The continuations of the sanctions and the absence of a 
physical confrontation suggests, that the intrinsic cost-benefit analysis which the theory declares 
happens continuously throughout the states, must either have been inconclusive or possibly have 
shown sanctions to be the lesser of two evils. Since such cost-benefit analyses differs across the 
states, it is therefore impossible to predict the outcome of such, as each state has their own agendas 
and goals, in addition to the putative collective of security. These might include import-export ties, 
and energy dependencies, which some countries have on Russian gas (EU Energy 2014). These 
issues, which would constitute low politics, within the theory, cannot be ignored as a factor of said 
cost-benefit analyses - and will inevitably influence any negotiations of interstate relations - since: 
"The room for manoeuvre of each state is primarily limited by outside economic constraints." 
(Saurugger 2014; 59). The amending and further comprehensive sanctions do show however, that 
the interests generally remain the same; namely the acknowledgement of the territorial integrity and 
thus international law, which in itself is written in the context of security (UN Charter 2014). 
 
When the question, about further measures is invoked, it touches upon the direction of the EU 
sanctions. As seen in the sanction on the 30
th
 of July, show an increase of economic impediments 
against Russia. This might very well be due to, albeit unity of the sanctions have been reached, that 
political unity, when cooperation of diverging national interests ensue, is difficult as a result of 
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different foreign policy outlooks and economic capabilities of individual states. As the ability to 
secure an independent defense seems to be declining, in the attempt to increase economic and social 
services, a defense regime of the EU, seems unfeasible, albeit it would alleviate the need for US 
presence (Hoffmann 1995; 224). This might well be the plight of the EU. The economic 
cooperation within the EU, is reflected in the sanctions themselves, as this is the conduct between 
states in the EU. A further step towards defensive actions would impose the need for more powerful 
central institutions, which would reduce the autonomy of the states. This vacuum however 
consequently is a part of the EU limitations both in internal and external operations. What this 
means for the sanctions at hand is that considering the importance of economic and social services, 
the standard conduct within and the diverging foreign policy positions within the EU member 
states, the sanctions, it would seem are no likely to take on a more belligerent nature. 
 
Has the EU faired adequately in the actions taken against the Russian Federation? In the two first 
phases of the analysis, the sanctions have had an economic effect; thus cementing what EU does 
best. The EU is not a military nor defensive alliance, and the continued focus on the nation state as 
the sole legitimate autonomic society, the EU have acted in line with what must be expected and 
what seems to adhere to the theoretical assumptions; namely that through cooperation, negotiations 
and the weighing of national interest, the measures taken presumably would reflect the pre-existing 
instrumental institutions. It would therefore be unlikely to see this union enacting measures of a 
belligerent kind, when not compelled by a just cause to go to war. And even then, this task would 
likely be undertaken by NATO or the individual states. 
 
Continued, it is therefore believed that further sanctions enacted by the EU, will continue to carry 
economic impediments, as this seems to be the measure of EU foreign policy power. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
 
This project set out to analyze the measures taken by the EU, in order to coerce Russia, and whether 
these are in line with contemporary theoretical convictions. The project has reached this goal 
through theoretical and empirical investigations. It is important to note that the project is only able 
to evaluate the sanction regime against Russia and the conduct of the EU within the defined period.  
Through the tripartition of the analysis, we have come these conclusions: 
 
The EU had in the beginning clear goals, and adopted targeted sanctions which were travel bans and 
freezing of financial assets among other impediments. One of goals was met in late March, when 
the OSCE was sent to monitor the situation. But this, however, did not change much. It was clear 
that the EU adopted small, but incremental steps in sanctioning Russia, but these measures were not 
enough to alter Russia's behavior, leading the EU to additionally target individuals and entities. The 
scope and utilization changed, as was evident on June the 24th, in which the sanctions were now 
targeted more broadly. When the MH17 was brought down, the EU targeted their sanctions more 
comprehensively which continued into September 19th. The overall approach that the EU has 
utilized is characterized as the Turning of the Screw typology.  
 
In the beginning, the effect of the sanctions were minor and Russia took these lightly. However, it is 
visible by looking at the timeline of events, and the different economic data, that slowly but surely 
the effect became evident. After July the Russian economy was additionally sanctioned. The result 
thereafter was that the Russian economy stagnated. This was due to the capital flight, also evident 
before July 17, and the targeted industrial and financial sectors. By sanctioning the key sectors, 
Russia's businesses were both cut off from capital and the market in the EU. The impact of oil 
prices dropping is not related to the sanction regime, but has had an important effect on Russia's 
ability to gain revenue. It would therefore seem that, in a comprehensive perspective, the sanctions 
are having an impact.  
 
The reasoning for why the EU enacted the sanctions must be viewed in terms of the concepts of 
high and low politics. The EU enacted the sanctions against Russia based on the idea of 
cooperation, because of the asymmetrical relationship not only internally, but also externally, as the 
individual states would have difficulties coercing Russia. Thus by making a collective response, the 
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coercion is more effective. However, the EU is also constrained when coercing Russia, due to the 
cost-benefit analysis each state generates. The issues connected with such an analysis are, for 
instance, energy dependencies on Russian gas. Economics are considered low politics, but since the 
EU inherently focuses on economic cooperation, instead of defense, economics will have a high 
level of influence on the domain of high politics. The EU has acted in accordance with its available 
instruments deriving from its structural limitations.  
 
Therefore we conclude that the sanctions - enacted by the EU, when trying to coerce the Russian 
Federation - are in line with contemporary theoretical convictions and thus the appropriate measures 
taken. 
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6.0 Implications 
 
The EU has reacted, as one might expect from an Intergovernmentalist perspective. The EU defined 
the belligerent actions of Russia as a question of security and reacted promptly by implementing 
sanctions. The explanatory power of Intergovernmentalism is in this regard satisfied - however it 
has the consequence of delimiting the EU in certain aspects of maneuvering. When looking at what 
the EU has achieved, one must in addition look to the West. The EU has not been alone in the 
sanctioning of Russia and the US sanctions might very well have had an equal effect on Russia thus 
veiling the actual outcome of the EU sanctions, specifically. Alas, it would seem that Russia has not 
been compelled. 
 
Where to go from here, if Russia does not comply, and thus what happens if coercion fails? What if 
the EU and indeed the US can't compel Putin? Does this mean he is an irrational actor? 
If the compellence of Russia fails, one must assume that the next step will be taken. This could lead 
to war, and since the only institution that can legitimize war, is the UN, who has Russia as a 
permanent veto carrying member of the Security Council, it is highly unlikely that the UN would 
ever authorize military intervention within the Russian geopolitical sphere of interest. The EU must 
therefore look to the West or to itself to enforce international law, by possibly breaking 
international law. Here we enter a paradox. Can international law be broken to uphold international 
law? By applying the theory of Intergovernmentalism, the answer becomes a simple yes, but does 
entail the aspect of unilateralism, which in itself complicates and makes such action dangerous. 
Again, we incorporate the preponderant military power of the international system. Only the US 
seems to have the power to act unilaterally, which has been the case in their own sanction regime 
and in previous conflicts. It would seem, when drawing on Hoffmann's work, that the EU needs the 
US, especially its power of deterrence. Although some of Hoffmann's writings are from the 
beginning of the 1980s it still seems to merit the environment of the EU: "It would not eliminate 
[...] the fundamental plight: the need to rely on American nuclear guarantee [...]" (Hoffmann 1995; 
224).  
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